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Co-Conspirator Declarations: The 
Federal Rules of Evidence and 
Other Recent Developments, From 
a Criminal Law Perspective* 
by Paul Marcus** 
Perhaps the most important advantage available to a prosecutor 
in a criminal conspiracy case is the exception to the hearsay rule for 
co-conspirator declarations. The exception is widely used and is 
often a significant part of the government presentation. 1 In essence, 
it provides that otherwise inadmissible hearsay declarations of co-
conspirators are admissible at trial against the defendant so long as 
they were made during the course and in furtherance of the conspir-
acy.2 The exception typically arises when an alleged co-conspirator-
declarant tells the witness (often an undercover police officer) all 
about the conspiracy, perhaps in the hope of attracting a buyer or a 
seller of drugs. During the conversation the defendant is identified 
as a member of the group. The witness then is called to testify at 
trial about this conversation. 
Numerous judges and commentators have explored why the ex-
ception is so important in a case like this. Basically it is because the 
declarant is often not available for cross-examination, and the wit-
ness is now specifically naming this defendant as having participated 
in the conspiracy.3 During the last several years, major changes have 
taken place which have affected the exception itself, its general appli-
~ation, and proof problems in connection with specific types of con-
spiracies. While some of these issues have been addressed 
previously,4 they have been viewed primarily from the vantage point 
* ©1979 by Paul Marcus. 
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
l. Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 
GEORGETOWN L. J. 925, 941 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Agreement]. 
2. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974). 
3. See generally, P. MARCUS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIR-
ACY CASES (Matthew Bender and Co., 1978, 1979 Supplement) at Section 5.02 [hereinafter 
cited as PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE). 
4. See, e.g., Bergman The Co-Conspirators Exception: Defining the Standard of the In-
dependent Evidence Test under the New Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 HoFSTRA L. REV. 99 
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of persons with expertise in the area of evidence law. Rarely, how-
ever, have these problems been analyzed in terms of general criminal 
law issues such as the quantum of proof required at trial or the pro-
cedures to be employed at a conspiracy trial. 
This article will focus attention on five major aspects of the co-
conspirator exception shaped considerably by recent events: the 
structure of the exception, the three elements of the exception, trial 
procedures utilized in connection with it, confrontation clause chal-
lenges to it, and the scope of the conspiracy. Numerous other 
problems are related to the hearsay exception and indeed can be vi-
tal to the trial and appellate practice in conspiracy cases.5 Neverthe-
less, such problems have been omitted here either because there have 
been few recent developments of significance, or because the relation 
is not close. 6 
THE HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
The Rationale 
The co-conspirator declaration is a well-established exception to 
the hearsay rule. Indeed, the co-conspirator exception is so well-es-
tablished that the co-conspirator's statements are allowed in even if 
no conspiracy is charged so long as there is evidence supporting a 
conspiracy theory? The exception has been severely criticized by 
(1976); Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigation: Pulling 
the Conspiracy Back into the Co-conspirator Rule, 5 HoFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1976). 
5. These problems involve a wide range of issues: general proof questions-see, e.g., 
United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir. 1960), the state of mind requirement of 
defendants-see, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) and issues combining both 
double jeopardy questions and the traditional Wharton's Rule contention-see, e.g. Iannelli v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977). 
6. One recurring trial matter worthy of note is the general practice of naming unindicted 
co-conspirators in the indictment. This is coming under attack throughout the country. This 
problem is, of course, related to the hearsay exception question, for while the original declar· 
ant may be an unindicted co-conspirator, the presence of the co-conspirator's name in the 
indictment or in the bill of particulars will not determine the admissibility of the declaration. 
In United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 805 (5th Cir. 1975), the two appellants were not 
charged but were named in the indictment, while other persons were alleged to be conspirators 
but their names were not given in the indictment. The court concluded that due process re-
quired that the indictments be expunged so that all references to the appellants were deleted, 
and suggested the use of a bill of particulars as a suitable alternative for the government. Most 
courts to consider the question since Briggs have followed its lead and ordered the names of 
unindicted co-conspirators to be expunged from the indictment. United States v. Chadwick, 
556 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1977); State v. Porro, 152 N.J. Supr. 179, 377 A.2d 909 (1977), appeal 
dismissed, 391 A.2d 517 (1978). For a particularly good discussion of the problem, see Appli-
cation of Jordan, 439 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D. W. Va. 1977). 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 522 F.2d 29, 31 (6th Cir. 1975). 
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commentators and particularly defense counsel. Nevertheless, it is 
relied upon by prosecutors in a rather remarkable number of cases. 8 
The rationale normally given for the hearsay exception is Learned 
Hand's view of the conspiracy as an agency relationship. 
Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the law 
of evidence, but of the substantive law of crime. When 
men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end, they be-
come ad hoc agents for one another, and have made "a 
partnership in crime." What one does pursuant to their 
common purpose, all do, and, as declaratiOns may be such 
acts, they are competent against all.9 
While this agency theory has been the subject of some considerable 
criticism, 10 it remains the chief rationale for the exception and has 
been consistently relied upon. 11 So long as the prosecution demon-
strates that the co-conspirator declaration was made during the 
course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the conspiracy, the co-
conspirator's declaration is admissible. 12 
The Federal Rules of Evidence 
Federal Rule of Evidence 80l(d)(2)(E) essentially retains the 
traditional elements of the co-conspirator's declaration exception. 
The rule states, in material part, that such statements are admissible 
if they are made "by a co-conspirator of a party during the course 
and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 13 The major change in sub-
stance is that co-conspirator's declarations are now explicitly listed 
by the rule as not being hearsay. 14 While defense counsel may well 
argue that the elimination of the declaration as hearsay precludes 
argument to the jury that such declarations are unbelievable and 
8. See Criminal Agreement at 948. 
9. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2nd Cir. 1926). 
10. "The agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis 
for admissibility beyond that already established." Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed 
Federal Rules oJ Evidence, Commentary to§ 80l(d)(2)(E). 
11. The rationale for both the hearsay-conspiracy exception and its limitations is the 
notion that conspirators are partners in crime. As such, the law deems them agents of 
one another. And just as the declarations of an agent bind the principal only when 
the agent acts within the scope of his authority, so the declaration of a conspirator 
must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in order to be admissible 
against his partner. (Citations omitted) 
Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6 (1974). 
12. /d. 
13. These elements have basically remained unchanged for decades. See generally, Levie, 
Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. LAW REV. 1159 (1954). 
14. This is as opposed to the procedural rules governing the admissibility of evidence, 
such as questions to be resolved by the judge or jury, the quantum of evidence required, and so 
forth. See, text accompanying notes 56-91, i'!fra. 
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"rank hearsay", the courts apparently believe that no significant 
change has been wrought by the rule. Judge Heaney made this point 
very clearly in a recent case: 
We recognize that Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(E) provides that 
a statement by the defendant's co-conspirator during the 
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not hearsay. 
The distinction between a statement which is not hearsay 
and a statement which is an exception to the hearsay rule is 
semantic and is not determinative of the outcome of this 
case. 15 
THE THREE COMPONENTS 
Whether under the Federal Rules or not, declarations of co-con-
spirators are admissible against the defendant only if three elements 
are satisfied: 1) the statement was made in furtherance of the con-
spiracy 2) it was made during the course of the conspiracy and 3) 
there is independent evidence to establish the conspiracy. 16 A good 
deal has been written generally about the interplay of these three 
elements and the nature of the evidence required to prove them. 17 
At this point, however, I will tum to those issues which are currently 
being pursued by prosecutors and defense counsel in connection 
with the three elements. 
The In Furtherance Requirement 
Of the three elements, this requirement creates the least diffi-
culty in actual practice. Despite some proposals for removing the in 
furtherance requirement, Is the Supreme Court continues to rely on 
iti9 and the Federal Rules expressly retain it. In light of proposals to 
eliminate the requirement, however, and Congress' rejection of such 
proposals, a number of courts are beginning to take a closer look at 
the in furtherance requirement in actual cases. Agreeing with one 
commentator, these courts indicate that the Congressional action 
"should be viewed as mandating a construction of the 'in further-
ance' requirement protective of defendants . . . ."20 
15. United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1231 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978). 
16. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974). 
17. See, e.g., C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE; WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE; PROSECUTION AND 
DEFENSE, supra. 
18. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EviDENCE rule 508(b) (1942) and United States v. Moore, 
522 F.2d 1068, 1077 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975). 
19. Anderson, supra n.16. 
20. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra at 801-147, quoted in United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 
92, 100 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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A recent Second Circuit analysis of the in furtherance require-
ment is illustrative of this protective stance. In United States v. 
Lang,21 the defendant was arrested knowing full well he was in pos-
session of counterfeit bills. The government, however, had to estab-
lish that he was in possession of the money with an intent to defraud. 
The only proof offered by the government that the defendant in-
tended to pass the money and hence defraud was a taped telephone 
conversation between the defendant's supplier of the bills, Carey, 
and an undercover agent. This conversation took place three days 
after Lang's arrest. It consisted primarily of statements by Carey 
that Lang had certain money with him when he was arrested. When 
the government sought to introduce this conversation at trial 
(through a tape recording of the conversation) it had to make it fall 
within the co-conspirator declaration rule. Without the rule, the 
statement would be inadmissible hearsay, being an out-of-court 
statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that 
Lang had the money with him and thus was in the business of pass-
ing the money with intent to defraud. 
The Second Circuit quite properly found that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to establish that this statement was made in further-
ance of the conspiracy. The government had argued that it was in 
furtherance because it somehow "advanced the interest of the al-
leged conspiracy between Lang and Carey . . . that it was in Lang's 
interest to have Carey in business."22 The problem with the govern-
ment's argument, as the court found, was that Lang was under arrest 
when the statement was made so that a conversation with the gov-
ernment agent could do nothing to advance any venture in which 
Lang himself was concerned. Thus even if the statement could have 
furthered a conspiracy that Carey was involved with, it was impossi-
ble to see how it could further a conspiracy that Lang was involved 
with. Considering that there was no evidence that Lang had any 
interest in any other business with Carey, and at most was involved 
with the transaction for which he was arrested, the statement simply 
was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. Without the statement, 
there was no evidence that Lang was in business to make a profit and 
hence its admission was reversible error.23 
The Ninth Circuit also took a close look at the prosecution's in 
furtherance argument within the past year. In United States v. Eu-
21. 589 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1978). 
22. /d. at 100. 
23. /d. 
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banks,24 the defendants were part of a drug distribution ring. One of 
the members of the ring, the deceased Gonzales, was living in a com-
mon-law marriage relationship with the witness. This witness told at 
trial of three sets of conversations involving the conspirators. The 
first set included conversations between the conspirators which were 
clearly in furtherance of the conspiracy because "they set in motion 
transactions that were an integral part of the heroin distribution 
scheme."25 The second set of conversations was more difficult. 
These were conversations between the witness and Gonzales where 
Gonzales told her of his plans to go to a city to pick up heroin for the 
group. Because Gonzales was not attempting to persuade the wit-
ness to join the group at that time, the statement was not in further-
ance of the conspiracy. It was "at best, nothing more that [a] casual 
admission of culpability to someone he had individually decided to 
trust."26 The final declaration was the most difficult of all, as these 
incriminating statements by Gonzales were made to the witness after 
she had joined the conspiracy. Yet the court quite properly analyzed 
the statements for what they were: simple statements to that woman 
of the plans of the group and not statements designed to aid the ring. 
Hence, her "participation in the conspiracy did not convert Gonza-
les' statements to her into declarations in furtherance of the conspir-
acy."27 
The disposition of the government's arguments in Lang and 
Eubank is a refreshing and tough review of the in furtherance re-
quirement. While the statements in those cases were, without doubt, 
generally connected with the conspiracy, they did not truly further 
the conspiracy with which the defendants were associated. Hence, 
despite the statements by some commentators that the in furtherance 
language may be viewed "without much regard to whether [the state-
ment] in fact furthered the conspiracy,"28 the adoption of the re-
24. 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1979). 
25. I d. at 520. In these conversations the conspirators discussed plans of the group re-
garding distribution of the heroin, such as the parties to handle the sales, some specific 
purchases, etc. 
26. Id., quoting United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 1975). 
27. /d. The court went on to state: 
There is no indication in the record that these statements were any more than conver-
sations between conspirators that did nothing to advance the aims of the alleged con-
spiracy. The incriminating references to absent persons were not designed to induce 
... [the woman's] continued participation in the conspiracy or to alfay her fears. 
/d. at 521. 
28. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE,§ 267 at 645 (2d Ed. 1972) quoted in United States v. 
Moore, supra, 522 F.2d at 1077 n.5. 
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quirement by Congress now makes clear that the requirement is to 
be taken seriously indeed . 
.During the Course 
In recent years, there has been considerable activity at the trial 
court level concerning the requirement that the declaration be made 
during the course of the conspiracy. Most of this activity has been in 
two particular types of cases: first, those conspiracies which are said 
to have phases generally involving concealment and which therefore 
continue after the primary objective of the argument has been met, 
and second, those conspiracies where the government charges that 
the conspiracies continued "up to and including the date of return of 
the indictment." 
The Supreme Court, in a series of three cases, established the 
rule that there is not always a separate, implied conspiracy to con-
ceal which survives the major conspiracy?9 This rule applies both 
for purposes of the hearsay exception (whether the statement was 
made during the course of the conspiracy) and for statute of limita-
tions purposes. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan in the last of the 
three cases: 
By no means does this mean that acts of concealment can 
never have significance in furthering a criminal conspiracy. 
But a vital distinction must be made between acts of con-
cealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objec-
tives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after 
these central objectives have been attained, for the purpose 
only of covering up after the crime.30 
The Court was careful, however, to note that there are certain 
kinds of cases which inherently involve concealment,31 cases where 
"the successful accomplishment of the crime necessitates conceal-
ment."32 
The problem the courts have been grappling with in recent 
years is identifying cases which inherently involve concealment and 
which would therefore allow the conspiracy period to be extended. 
29. The three cases are Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Lutwak v. 
United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); and Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). For 
an excellent discussion of these issues as they relate to recent California law, see Oakley, From 
Hearsay to Eternity: Pendency and the Co-conspirator Exception in Cal!fornia-Fact, Fiction, 
and a Novel Approach, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. l (1975). 
30. Gmnewald, 353 U.S. at 405. 
31. The Court itself indicated that crimes inherently involving concealment would in-
clude kidnappers who were in hiding, waiting for ransom, or repainting a stolen car. 353 U S 
at 405. 
32. Jd. 
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For instance, in United States v . .Del Valle,33 the government proved 
the existence of a widespread fraud ring involving an attorney, a sec-
retary, an office manager, two runners, a practicing physician, and 
that physician's secretary. Through various ploys these parties sub-
mitted fraudulent medical bills to insurance companies. The de-
fendants were indicted for this offense soon after one of the 
defendants, the attorney, had attempted to influence witnesses who 
were to appear before a grand jury. At trial the government intro-
duced testimony about the grand jury incidents and also offered the 
attorney's statement made at that time. It justified this on the 
ground that the statements were made during the course of and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. Citing the Supreme Court cases, the 
defendants argued that the act of the attorney in attempting to con-
ceal the conspiracy was not a main part of the conspiracy and hence 
was not during the course of it. The court rejected this reasoning, 
finding that the nature of the conspiracy here was not aimed at ac-
complishing a single objective, but had a "continuing sequence of 
objectives."34 Moreover, the declarant in this case was the attorney 
who had, at least as part of his function, the role of protecting the 
conspiracy "from those investigative agencies which threatened its 
continuation." Therefore, the court concluded, his attempts to influ-
ence witnesses, and his statements at that time, were not acts of con-
cealment related only to a past objective. "They were parts of 
continuing activity that was essential to . . . the survival of an ongo-
ing operation."35 
The opinion in .Del Valle may well be sound as a means of con-
struing the Supreme Court decisions on concealment. It was a far-
reaching conspiracy there, and the conspirators were on notice as to 
the broad nature of the business. Nevertheless, the attorney's state-
ments must certainly be approaching the outer limits of admissibil-
ity. While it was a wide-ranging conspiracy, there was no evidence 
to indicate that individual members of the conspiracy had ever dis-
cussed or even foreseen that influencing witnesses before a grand 
jury would be a part of the "concealment phase" of the conspiracy. 
Indeed, it was not shown that the parties had agreed that the attor-
ney would take it upon himself to further goals of the conspiracy by 
engaging in any such activities. Still, because of the nature of the 
operation, it is difficult to conclude that such activities were not dur-
33. 587 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1979). 
34. Id. at 704. 
35. Id. 
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ing the course of the conspiracy. After all, this was a business whose 
sole purpose was to engage in fraud. It is hard to believe that the 
attorney, among others in the group, did not possess inherent powers 
to do precisely what he did. Without such a large and sophisticated 
operation, perhaps such activities would not be considered part of 
the course of the conspiracy; in lJel Valle, however, the operation no 
doubt contemplated precisely what took place-active concealment 
of the defendants' crimes. 
A similar situation is found in United States v. Mackey.36 In 
Mackey, a complicated scheme involving tax evasion and conspiracy 
to evade taxes was charged. In addition, the government indictment 
alleged that the conspiracy continued until the date of the filing of 
the indictment. Testimony before a grand jury investigating the 
scheme proved to be incriminating to a number of the conspirators. 
This testimony was then offered at trial as an exception to Rule 
80l(d)(2)(E). The court quite properly stated that whether or not 
such statements were made during the duration of the conspiracy 
would depend "upon the scope of the agreement entered into by its 
members and is therefore dependent on the facts in each case.'m 
In order to demonstrate that, as claimed, the conspiracy contin-
ued up to the time of the grand jury proceeding and indictment, the 
government must use more than circumstantial evidence that some 
conspirators attempted to cover up their illegal venture.38 In Mack-
ey, strong proof of concealment was present. The scheme was a 
broad effort to evade taxes, and that type of activity by its very na-
ture required substantial concealment efforts. Moreover, because the 
government's efforts at collecting taxes were continuing, the conceal-
ment efforts would have to be continuing as well. Finally, because 
concealment of taxes was such an inherent part of evading the pay-
ment of taxes, the concealment phase of the conspiracy was during 
the course of the major portion of the conspiracy. As a consequence, 
the conspiracy did in fact exist up to the filing of the indictment and 
statements to the grand jury were made during the course ofthe con-
spiracy. 
The Mackey decision makes a good bit of sense in light of the 
context of the opinion. It was a widespread operation involving, in-
herently, concealment. When one fails to pay taxes and attempts to 
evade the payment of taxes, concealment is a necessary requirement. 
36. 571 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1978). 
37. Id. at 383. 
38. Id. 
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Therefore, until the parties are arrested, unless there is some clear 
break from the agre~ment, it would appear that the conspiracy does 
continue. No broad rule can be taken from Mackey, however, re-
garding the continuation of the conspiracy up to the filing of an in-
dictment. Simply because one conspirator attempts to cover up by 
giving false testimony to the grand jury does not mean that such 
concealment attempts are part of the conspiracy. Truly, the determi-
nation must be on a case-by-case method with close scrutiny given to 
government claims that concealment is an inherent part of the con-
spiracy and continues to the time the indictment is returned. 
Independent Evidence 
The traditional rule has been that when the government at-
tempts to establish the existence of the conspiracy for the purpose of 
proving the two elements of "in furtherance" and "during the 
course," it must do so by using independent evidence other than the 
hearsay declaration itself.39 Without proof independent of the hear-
say statement itself, "hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps 
to the level of competent evidence."40 This rule of independent evi-
dence has survived without change through most of the century. 
After the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, 
some courts doubted whether the independent evidence rule was still 
viable. Chief among these courts was the First Circuit beginning 
with United States v. Petrozziel/o.41 Because the Rules allowed the 
question of admissibility in this area to be determined by the judge,42 
the court penp.itted "a trial judge to base his 'determination' on hear-
say and other inadmissible evidence."43 Without discussing the 
point in detail, the court conceded that: 
The use of inadmissible evidence to determine the existence 
of a conspiracy seems to contradict the traditional doctrine 
that conspiracy must be proved by independent nonhearsay 
evidence. It suggests that a conspiracy may be proved by 
the very statement seeking admittance. While the logic of 
the new rul.e may _eermit bootstrapping of this sort, earlier 
case law reJects It. 
Before Petrozziello was decided, but after it had been argued, 
39. The independent proof element is often referred to as "proof aliunde." 
40. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942). 
41. 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977). 
42. See text accompanying notes 81-91 i'!fra. 
43. 548 F.2d at 23. 
44. Id. n.2, citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 
296 
Co-conspirator Declarations 
the court heard argument in United States v. Martorano.45 The court 
indicated in Martorano that after the issuance of its opinion, it re-
ceived a petition for rehearing which had been granted on the pre-
cise issue of whether the new Federal Rules altered the independent 
evidence rule.46 The court relied heavily on the express language of 
Rule 104(a) in reaffirming Martorano. This rule provides: 
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a per-
son to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the ad-
missibility of evidence shall be determined by the judge, 
subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In makfug liis 
determination he is not bound by the rules of evidence ex-
cept those with respect to privileges. 
In finding that the trial judge could "base his determination on hear-
say and other inadmissible evidence, including perhaps the very 
statement seeking admission,"47 the First Circuit once again recog-
nized the impact of its holding on Glasser and the independent evi-
dence rule generally. The court's conclusion as to this impact was as 
follows: 
The new rules, however, explicitly contemplate the consid-
eration of such hearsay evidence in maKing preliminary 
findings of fact. We believe the new rules must be taken as 
overrUling Glasser to the extent that it held that the state-
ment seeking admission cannot be considered in making 
the determination whether a conspiracy exists.48 
The First Circuit was not yet finished with this matter, because 
it granted leave to file briefs on the issue of the independent evidence 
rule. The court felt that the rule was "in some doubt," but it did not 
have to face the question squarely because it found that, even under 
the independent evidence rule, the statement was properly admissi-
ble.49 While seemingly stepping back from its earlier clear holding 
concerning the overruling of Glasser,50 the court did mention in its 
final opinion that even if the statements were otherwise inadmissible, 
"the question here is whether such reliable evidence may be consid-
ered by the district court in determining the preliminary fact whether 
45. 557 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977). 
46. Jd. n.•. 
47. /d. at 11. 
48. /d. at 12. 
49. 561 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1977). 
50. The court was careful not to express its views as a holding. 
We emphasize that our opinions in this case should not be understood as deciding 
anything about the continued viability of Glasser. We intend to have done no more 
than indicate the basis for our doubts. Our decision in this case rests solely upon our 
view that the "independent" evidence established the existence of a concerted mutual 
venture. 
I d. at 409. 
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a conspiracy exists."51 This question was answered in the affirma-
tive. 
Unlike the First Circuit, other federal courts that have dealt 
with the reliable evidence issue have answered the above question in 
the negative. For the vast majority of courts, the independent evi-
dence rule is still the law and the hearsay statement itself may not be 
used by the trial judge in determining whether a conspiracy existed 
or whether the declarant or the defendants were part of it. Most 
circuit courts have been quite direct in disagreeing with the First Cir-
cuit's position. For instance, the Seventh Circuit remarked that it 
remained "[m]indful of our duty to strictly scrutinize the sufficiency 
of the nonhearsay evidence establishing the conspiracy's existence 
and linking each defendant to it."52 The Eighth Circuit was even 
more direct: 
We are aware that the First Circuit has recently suggested 
by way of dictum that under Federal Rule of Evidence 104 
the out-of-court statement itself may be considered by the 
trial judge in determining its admissibility .... We feel 
that this "bootstrapping" procedure is unwarranted and 
was not contemplated m the enactment of Rule 104; we 
thus adhere to our prior decisions requiring independent ev-
idence of a conspiracy. 53 (emphasis in the original) 
The most recent retention of the independent evidence rule is found 
in the Fifth Circuit en bane decision in United States v. James.54 
Although Rule 104(a) provides that the court "is not bound 
by the rules of Evidence except those with respect to privi-
leges" we do not construe this language as permitting the 
court to rely upon the content of the very statement whose 
admissibility is at issue. We adhere to our requirement es-
tablished in Apollo that fulfillment of the conditions of ad-
missibility must be established by evidence independent of 
the co-conspirator statement itself. This construction of 
Rule 104(a) comports with earlier Supreme Court pro-
nouncements that admissibility must depend upon in-
dependent evidence in order to prevent this statement from 
"lift[ing] itself bv its own bootstraps to the level of compe-
tent evtdence."55 
Little pause is necessary in reaching agreement with the major-
ity position. To use the conspirator statement itself in determining 
51. Id. at 408. 
52. United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 835 (7th Cir. 1977). 
53. United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (1978). 
54. 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979). For further discussion of this case, see text accompany-
ing note 66, infta. 
55. 590 F.2d at 581. 
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its admissibility is to render the conviction process meaningless. T)le 
requirement of independent proof comes from a deep and very legit-
imate concern that the declaration may be unreliable but also ex-
ceedingly prejudicial to the defendant's case. Allowing the 
statement itself to establish its own admissibility would result in ef-
fectively eliminating the defendant's ability to screen inappropriate 
declarations in a good many cases. No policy can be served by such 
a process. 
TRIAL PROCEDURES FOR Co-CONSPIRATOR DECLARATIONS 
We now begin an analysis of the trial procedures utilized in 
connection with the co-conspirator declarations, the kinds of day-to-
day issues attorneys actually face. Three particular procedural as-
pects of the problem have been drawn out: the standard of proof for 
co-conspirator declarations; the order of proof in conspiracy cases; 
and the question of whether it is the judge or the jury who deter-
mines the admissibility of the declarations. 
Standard of Proof 
For a long time prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence there was no consistent pattern in the courts concerning the 
standard of proof for the admissibility of co-conspirator declara-
tions. Circuits differed and panels within circuits differed.56 Since 
the adoption of the Rules, though, the federal courts have been 
somewhat more circumspect in their analysis of the standard. 
Within the past several years, four primary standards have been 
mentioned as the basis for admitting co-conspirator declarations. In 
the 1976 edition of his widely respected treatise, Judge Weinstein 
urged a very high standard indeed as a prerequisite for admission of 
a co-conspirator declaration. 
The better practice would be to require a very high degree 
of proof before admitting the statement. Only if the court 
is itself convinced beyond a reasonable doubt--considering 
hearsay as well as non-hearsay evidence-of the conspir-
acy, defendant's membership, and that the statement was 
made in furtherance thereof, should it admit.57 
56. Indeed, in one case the Fourth Circuit noted that the " 'substantial, independent evi-
dence' test ... [is] expressed ... in terms of 'prima facie proof of the conspiracy,' or proof by 
a 'fair preponderance' of independent evidence." United States v. Strope, 538 F.2d 1063, 1065 
(4th Cir. 1976). 
57. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE {1976) ~ 104(05) at 104-44, as discussed in United States v. 
Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978). See also, Bergman, The Co-conspirators Exception: 
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This standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" would be non-
sensical if applied to juries, yet many juries were given just that stan-
dard and told they would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that all elements of the conspiracy were present and that the defend-
ant and the declarant were members of the group before the state-
ment could be considered.58 With the application of the standard to 
judges,S9 the proposition makes a good deal more sense, particularly 
in light of the widespread use of the hearsay exception.60 No circuit 
opinion has been found, however, adopting the reasonable doubt 
standard for judge determinations. Most courts to consider the point 
have agreed in essence with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United 
States v. Santiago.61 There, the court rejected the reasonable doubt 
standard, contending that the judge was ruling not on guilt or inno-
cence but only on admissibility; hence, the government's burden 
need not be so onerous. Moreover, even "on the issue of the volun-
tariness of a confession the Supreme Court in Lego v. Twomey . . . 
found that a preponderance of evidence was sufficient to permit the 
introduction of the questioned confession."62 
The second standard suggested is a more troublesome one, find-
ing its origin in dicta in the Supreme Court's famous decision in 
United States v. Nixon.63 In discussing the admissibility of subpoe-
naed tapes, the Court discussed, as an example of admissibility, dec-
larations of co-conspirators. In a footnote the Chief Justice stated 
that in such cases, "there must be substantial, independent evidence 
of the conspiracy, at least enough to take the question to the jury."64 
\Vhile most courts have not found this dicta to be binding on them in 
co-conspirator cases, the Fifth Circuit adopted it fully in its recent en 
bane decision in United States v. James. 65 In specifically relying on 
Nixon the court reiterated that "as a preliminary matter, there must 
be substantial, independent evidence of a conspiracy, at least enough 
to take the question to the jury."66 (The court applied the emphasis.) 
Apart from the fact that neither court has seriously defined such a 
/Jefining the Standard of the Independent Evidence Test Under the New Federal Rules of E••i· 
dence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 99, 106-07 {1976). 
58. See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 580 (5th Cir. 1979). 
59. See text accompanying notes 82-92, infra. 
60. See generally Criminal Agreement, supra. 
61. 582 F.2d I 128 (7th Cir. 1978). 
62. /d. at 1135. See a/so United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977). 
63. 418 u.s. 683 (1974). 
64. /d. at 701 n. 14. 
65. 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979). 
66. ld. at 581. 
300 
Co-conspirator Declarations 
standard, one difficulty with it is its lack of true historical definition 
or application. The court in James stated that it is more appropriate 
to adopt a substantial evidence rule than one which requires a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear 
what the requirements of the substantial evidence standard are, nor 
how it differs from other standards of proof. 
Most courts to consider the standard of proof question have not 
followed the Fifth Circuit. Rather, these courts have held either that 
there must be sufficient evidence of a prima facie case or that there 
must be proof of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. 
As to the application and definitions of these two standards, it is gen-
erally conceded that the prima facie standard is a lesser requirement. 
The requirement of prima facie proof is less stringent than 
that of a preponderance of the evidence. The former re-
quires oniy enough evidence to take the question to the 
jury, whereas the latter requires "proof which leads the jury 
to find that the existence of the contested fact is more prob-
able than its non-existence".67 
Despite this lower quantum of proof, or perhaps because of it, 
relatively few courts have adopted the prima facie evidence test.68 
Without question, the most popular standard to be applied, by an 
overwhelming majority of the circuits, is the standard which allows 
the declaration to be heard by the jury if the judge finds that the 
conspiracy and the declarant's and the defendant's part in it were 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.69 
Although the prima facie standard is no longer appropri-
ate, we see no reason to require that a conspiracy be proved 
beyond a reasonable douot. That is the standard tlie jury 
will apply to the evidence as a whole. The judge is ruling 
on admissibility, not guilt or innocence; the government's 
burden need not be so ~reat. The ordinary civil standard is 
sufficient; if it is more likely than not the declarant and the 
defendant were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay 
statement was made, and that the statement was in further-
ance of a conspiracy, the hearsay is admissible.70 
67. United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 812 n. 8 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
68. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977). 
69. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978): United States v. 
Smith, 578 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978). 
70. Petrozziel/o, supra, 548 F.2d at 23. For a good discussion of this point, see Saltzburg. 
Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STANFORD L. REv. 271. 303-04 
(1975). 
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Order of Proof 
In most jurisdictions, the order of proof rule was consistent re-
gardless of whether the judge or jury determined the admissibility of 
the declaration. The co-conspirator declaration could be received in 
evidence "subject to being connected up." That is, the jury could be 
instructed that admissibility had not yet been resolved and the decla-
ration was simply offered at an early point in the trial for clarity in 
the prosecution's case. Of course, if the declaration was not con-
nected up, i.e., if it was later found that the statement was inadmissi-
ble, the testimony could be stricken or the judge could grant a 
motion for a mistrial.71 In only the rarest of cases was the broad 
discretion of the trial judge to deal with the order of proof in the co-
conspirator· declaration situation seriously challenged.72 With the 
advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, some courts be-
gan to question the broad discretionary power regarding the order of 
proof. The most striking example of this is found in the Fifth Cir-
cuit's panel and en bane decisions in United States v. James.13 
While the panei decision by Judge Tuttle recognized the broad 
discretion in proof generally available under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence/4 the court concluded that the trial judge could not admit 
a conspirator's declarations until the judge had determined that the 
government had made the required "threshold showing." 
[T]he judge cannot allow the jury to hear a co-conspirator's 
declaration until he has determined admissibility oy a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. If the prosecution should seek 
to introduce a co-conspirator's declaration early in the trial, 
sufficient evidence to support the threshold finding may not 
have come in. Thus, tl:ie government must either develop 
its proof of conspiracy and the defendant's and the declar-
ant's connection with it before tendering a co-conspirator's 
statement or make such proof at an extra jury hearing.75 
71. See generally, Apollo v. United States, 476 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1973). 
72. See discussion in PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE, Sllpra, at § 5.05(3](bj. 
73. 'The panel decision is reported at 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978). The en bane decision 
is reported at 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979). 
74. Rule 61 I(a) provides: "The judge shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and 
order ofinterrogating witnesses in presenting evidence so as to {I) make the interrogation and 
presentation effective for the ascertainment of proof, (2) avoid consumption of time, and (3) 
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." 
75. 576 F.2d at 1131. The court's mention of the "extra jury hearing" led to considerable 
fears in the Fifth Circuit of required pre-trial hearings on the admissibility of a conspirator's 
declaration. As indicated below, however, the en bane decision obliterated any "requirement" 
for extra jury hearings. 
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Judge Tuttle was most concerned with the prejudicial impact on the 
jury of the common "connecting up" situation. As he stated, 
[T]he judge would have to instruct the jury to perform the 
intellectually difficult task of deciding the case while disre-
garding preJudicial evidence of strikfug relevance ... 76 
The court en bane reconsidered this strict order of proof ruling. 
In an opinion by Judge Clark, the full court conceded "the danger to 
a defendant in a conspiracy trial when the government tenders a co-
conspirator's statement before laying the foundation for its admis-
sion.'m The court backed away, however, from the panel's ruling. 
Instead, it discussed a "preferred order of proof." 
The district court should, whenever reasonably practicable, 
require the showing of a conspiracy and of the connection 
of the defendant With it before admitting declarations of a 
co-conspirator. If it determines it is not reasonably .Practi-
cal to require the showing to be made before admittmg the 
evidence, the court may admit the statement subject to be-
ing connected up.78 
The en bane court's decision makes a good deal of sense. It 
seeks to avoid the connecting up problem whenever possible, but 
leaves enough discretion for the trial judge to allow the early state-
ment in a complex matter where the sequence of testimony may well 
be highly important. Even this preferred order of proof, rather than 
the required one in the panel decision, goes well beyond the usual 
order of proof procedure adopted by most courts after the Federal 
Rules. Most courts still talk in terms of "the procedure of provision-
ally admitting a co-conspirator's statements."79 Because it allows for 
discretion, while encouraging the elimination of serious prejudice in 
many cases, the "preferred order of proof' standard set out in James 
as well as elsewhere should be widely adopted.80 
76. /d. 
77. 590 F.2d at 581. 
78. /d. at 582. 
79. United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 502 (9th Cir. 1978). 
80. The new rule requiring a specific determination of the existence of a conspiracy 
by the court on the record does not alter the traditional discretion of the trial judge to 
allow the government to place the statement into evidence on the condition that it be 
later shown by sufficient independent evidence that a conspiracy existed. It is prefer-
able whenever possible that t.h~ government's indepef!dent. proof of t~e consP.ir.acy_ be 
introduced first, thereby avotdmg the danger, recogmzed m Petrozzrel/o, of mJectmg 
the record with inadmissible hearsay in anticipation of proof of a conspiracy which 
never materializes. (citation omitted) 
United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1049 n.3 (8th Cir. 1978). 
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Admissibility, A Judge or Jury Question? 
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, the circuits were di-
vided on the question of who was to determine the admissibility of 
co-conspirator declarations. Some courts took the position that the 
judge alone would determine the admissibility of co-conspirator dec-
larations. As stated by Judge Friendly, it is "for the judge to deter-
mine whether there was sufficient evidence that the defendant 
against whom the declarations were offered had engaged in a 'con-
certed mutual venture' with the declarant."31 Other courts, however, 
followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit and allowed for participation 
by the jury. As explained by the Fifth Circuit in James: 
[T]he judge's role is to make a preliminary determination 
whether the government has presented sufficient evidence, 
independent of the hearsay itself, to support a finding by 
the jury that the alleged conspiracy existed and that the de-
clarant and the defendant against whom the statement is 
offered were members of that conspiracy . . . . 
If the judge is satisfied that this test has been met, then 
under existing law the jury is instructed, both when the 
hearsay is introduced and at the final charge, that it max 
consider the hearsay against a particular defendant only If 
it first finds that the conspiracy existed, that the declarant 
and the defendant were members of it, and that the state-
ment was made during the course of and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy.82 . 
With the adoption of the Rules, the debate on the subject be-
came more precise and pronounced. Rule 104, in particular, was the 
focal point for discussion. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary 
questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of 
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination 
1t is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with 
respect to privileges. 
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the rele-
vancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condi-
tion of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the 
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of 
the fulfillment of the condition. 
(c) Hearing ofjury. Hearings on the admissibility of 
confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hear-
81. United States v. Geaney, 4I7 F.2d I ll6, I ll9 (2d Cir. I969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S. 
I028 (I970). 
82. 590 F.2d at 578, citing Apollo, supra. 
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ing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters 
shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require 
or, when an accused be a witness, if he so requests. 
Because Rule 801, which defines the co-conspirator declaration 
principle, gives no guidance with respect to whether the judge or the 
jury determines admissibility, Rule 104 becomes the key. Yet, view-
ing the precise language of Rule 104 also offers little guidance. As 
explained in some detail by Judge Weinstein, this admissibility prob-
lem could legitimately be seen as falling within either subsection (a) 
or subsection (b), depending on the characterization of the problem; 
the admissibility question could then be resolved by either the judge 
or the jury. 
The problem can, on the one hand, be characterized as a 
matter of competence of the evidence-i.e., is the 
probability of its reliability sufficiently great to make it ad-
missible? Viewed from this perspective the/reliminary is-
sue of the existence of the conspiracy an the objecting 
defendant's part in it are questions for the judge to decide 
like any other question of hearsay or privilege. 
But, on the other hand, the issue can be framed in rele-
vancy terms where the question of admissibility turns on 
the relevancy of the evidence. Thus declarations of a co-
conspirator, while often interesting, are largely irrelevant to 
any Issue of defendant's guilt unless he is first shown to be 
connected with the conspiracy. Preliminary questions re-
garding relevance are frequently held to be for the jury af-
ter the introduction of sufficient evidence to justify a jury 
finding the existence of the preliminary fact. 
This discussion is directly on point. One can forcefully argue that 
co-conspirator declarations raise the greatest question of reliability; 
therefore, a judge ought to hear the issue. Yet one can also argue 
that because the existence of the conspiracy must first be proven, the 
relevancy of this evidence depends on a condition of fact; therefore, 
it is a matter for a jury, with proper instructions as previously done 
in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere. 84 
Some commentators have argued rather strenuously that the 
jury should retain its involvement in the admissibility questions for 
co-conspirator declarations. As is pointed out in the McCormick 
Treatise,85 the conspiracy findings appear to be in the traditional 
83. M. BERGER and J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, ~ 104[5) at 104-40 (1975), as 
discussed in James, supra, 576 F.2d at 1128-29. 
84. See text accompanying note 82 supra. 
85. C. McCORMICK HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 2nd Ed. §53 at 19 (Supp. 
1978). 
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mold of findings to be determined by the jury: 
More specifically, under the Federal and revised Uniform 
Rules, oeclarations of co-conspirators are expressedly re-
moved from the category of hearsay and are placed in the 
nonhearsay category of admissions. Thus rather than being 
a "technical" question of hearsay, the preliminary question 
is analogous to other cases of vicarious admissiOns. Was 
there an agency (conspiracy with defendant and declarant 
as members), and did the agent (declarant member of the 
conspiracy) make the statement? The questions are the 
kind that traditionally has been submitted to juries after a 
preliminary screening by the trial judge, as set forth in Rule 
1 04(b ), and this view finds substantial support in recent de-
cisions. This solution .is consistent witli the commonly 
stated requirement that the existence of the conspiracy be 
established by "independent" evidence and lays at rest any 
uneasiness lest the foundation be furnished by the "hear-
say" statement itself, since under Rule 104(b) the rules of 
evidence are applicable. (Footnotes omitted) 
Additionally, another commentator has taken the position that 
to apply Rule 104(b), retaining the jury's involvement, would actu-
ally aid the defendant. 
The revisionist's concern about the confusion and fu-
tility of asking the jury to twice decide the same fact is sim-
ilarly an insufficient basis to justify taking the issue from 
the JUry. As already indicated, this is no more futile than 
telling the jury to ignore testimony that has been stricken. 
But a far more important reason exists for submitting both 
preliminary and ultimate issues to the jury, despite the pos-
sible futility of the act. By charging the jury tliat they may 
not consider the co-conspirator statements until they have 
found independent proof of the existence of the conspiracy, 
the policy that led to the existence of this corroboration re-
quirement is fulfilled. The charge communicates to the 
jury the reluctance that exists, as a matter of law, in credit-
ing this evidence. It tells them that the courts recognize its 
potential unreliability. It alerts them to the danger of un-
ouly trusting the statements. 86 
Despite these contentions, the courts which have evaluated the 
argument have rejected the Rule 104(b) analysis and have instead 
indicated that the judge alone is to make determinations with regard 
to the declaration's admissibility.87 This article adopts that view. As 
86. Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigations: Pulling 
the Conspiracy Back in the Co-conspirator Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 96 (1976). 
87. The circuits are cited in the 1978 edition of WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE. For a represen-
tative sample, see, United States v. Petrozziello, supra; United States v. Santiago, supra; 
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the Fifth Circuit in James pointed out, "[A] rule that puts the admis-
sibility of co-conspirator statements in the hands of the jury does not 
avoid the danger that the jury might convict on the basis of these 
statements without first dealing with the admissibility questions."88 
The kinds of questions encompassed by Rule 104(b) should be ques-
tions which do not pose the danger of substantial prejudice to the 
defendant. Yet, conspiracy declarations are the kind which ought 
not to be considered on a preliminary basis by the jury. 
The admissibility of a co-conspirator's declarations in a 
conspiracy trial, however, does pose problems precisely be-
cause they are relevant. Such evidence endangers the in-
tegrity of the trial because the relevancy and apparent 
probative value of the statements may be so highly prejudi-
cial as to color other evidence even in the mind of a consci-
entious juror, despite instructions to disregard the 
statements or to consider them conditionally. As a result, 
such statements should be evaluated by the trained legal 
mind of the trial judge. 89 
The problem in allowing the jury to engage in the traditional 
two-step analysis of admissibility is that jurors may well be swept up 
by the enormity and prejudicial impact of the statement and may use 
the hearsay statement itself to prove the guilt of the defendant ini-
tially. Considering the vast number of cases in which the declaration 
problem arises90 and the heavy emphasis placed on it by prosecutors, 
the risk of serious and adverse impact on the jury will always be 
present in declaration cases, no matter who determines admissibility. 
While the risk will not be avoided in all cases, particularly where the 
traditional order of proof principle is retained, it can be lessened 
greatly by looking to the judge rather than to the jury to make the 
admissibility determination.91 
United States v. Macklin, supra; United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 377 (6th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied 434 U.S. 925; United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1979). 
88. 590 F.2d at 579. 
89. /d. 
90. See, Criminal Agreement, supra. 
91. See, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1978) ~ 104[05], 104-40: 
To ask the jurors to consider highly prejudicial statements of co-conspirators only if 
they first find the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it, is 
to present them with too tricky a task. In cases where the conspiracy is charged, it 
creates the absurdity of asking the jury in effect to decide the issue of guilt before it 
may consider evidence which is probative of guilt. Giving these preliminary ques-
tions to the jury violates the spirit of rule 104, which calls for preliminary determina-
tions by the judge in all cases involving a high potential for prejudice. 
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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ISSUE 
"The Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront wit· 
nesses against him is a fundamental right . . . made obligatory on 
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."92 The Sixth Amendment 
dictates that only reliable evidence be aqmitted against the defend· 
ant; hence, the right of cross examination of witnesses is of para-
mount importance.93 The reliability question is particularly difficult 
with co-conspirators' statements, since the impact on the defense 
case may be quite prejudicial although there is no opportunity to 
confront the original declarant. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did 
not discuss the basic issue until 1970 when it decided the case of 
.Dutton v. Evans.94 
In .Dutton, a four Justice plurality, (the Chief Justice and Jus-
tices White and Blackman, with Justice Stewart writing the opinion) 
held that the admission of hearsay declarations of co-conspirators 
did not, by themselves, violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause. While conceding that both the confrontation clause and the 
hearsay rule "stem from the same roots,"95 the Court concluded that 
the two were not the same and ought not to be treated the same for 
constitutional purposes. Thus, even though the declaration would 
not have been admissible in the federal courts,96 the Sixth Amend-
ment would not necessarily be violated. The hearsay rules and the 
confrontation clause were similar in origin, but not identical in ap-
plication. Without setting forth any clear rule for future adjudica-
tion of the problem, the Court's opinion focused on whether the 
evidence was crucial to the prosecution's case or devastating to the 
92. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (197tl), quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), 
which had applied the confrontation clause to the states. 
93. See generally Davenport, 17ze Co'!frontation ClaliSe and the Co-conspirator Exception 
in Criminal ProseCtJtion: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. Rev. 1378, 1379 (1972). 
94. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The other major confrontation clause case of recent years is 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, however, the question centered on the 
confrontation challenge to the use in a joint trial of a co'!ftssion of one of the co-defendants. 
Thus, the legal issues were quite different from those involved herein. For a broad discussion 
of Bruton, see PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE, Sllpra, at § 5.06. 
95. 400 U.S. at 86. 
96. The Court stated in .Dullon, id. at 81: 
It is settled that in federal conspiracy trials the hearsay exception that allows 
evidence of an out-of-court statement of one conspirator to be admitted against his 
fellow conspirators applies only if the statement was made in the course of and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, and not during a subsequent period when the conspir-
ators were engaged in nothing more than concealment of the criminal enterprise. 
The hearsay exception that Georgia applied in the present case, on the other hand, 
permits the introduction of evidence of such out-of-court statement even though 
made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy. (citations omitted). 
For a discussion of the concealment phase problem, see, text accompanying notes 29-39, supra. 
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defendant.97 Because the declaration was not that vital, and because 
there were "indicia of reliability" demonstrating that the statement 
should be placed before the jury, confrontation of the original de-
clarant was not required.98 
Dutton raised a good many problems which continue to plague 
the courts. Preliminarily, it is not clear what the holding is, for the 
opinion in Dutton was a plurality opinion, Justice Harlan joining the 
majority but writing a separate opinion.99 In addition, there is genu-
ine confusion concerning the problem of the availability of a witness 
who does not testify, 100 and the question of whether the trial court 
must make findings with regard to whether the declaration was cru-
cial to the government case or devastating to the defense remains 
unanswered. 101 
In this article, however, attention will be focused on one rela-
tively narrow question left open after Dutton, a question which is 
raised more often than any other confrontation issue in the federal 
courts. In .Dutton, the Court was faced with evidence which clearly 
violated the federal co-conspirator exception, yet it allowed the evi-
dence in considering the facts in that case. Does compliance with the 
federal exception establish that the confrontation clause has been 
"automatically" satisfied? The circuit courts have split in answering 
this question, and the Supreme Court in the period since Dutton has 
given no guidance. There are courts which take the position that 
compliance with the federal hearsay exception rule constitutes a per 
se validation under the confrontation clause. The Sixth Circuit very 
recently stated this without hesitation. 
Where evidence comes within this exception, the confron-
tation right under the Sixth Amendment is not violated, 
even if a statement clearly implicates the defendant and the 
declarant is unavailable for cross-examination. 102 
Some courts do not even seriously address the question, simply con-
97. This is a point well discussed by Davenport, supra, who attempts to formulate princi-
ples to govern the cases in this area. 
98. 400 U.S. at 87. 
99. Justice Harlan took a very limited view of the confrontation clause. 
In general, he would strictly limit the role of the confrontation clause to a literal right 
of the defendant to be present and cross-examine those "witnesses" who actually 
testify against him, i.e., not the declarants, but only the witnesses through whom the 
declarations are presented in court. Questions of abuse would then be left to the care 
of the due process clause, which he found unnecessary to invoke in Dull on. 
Davenport, supra, 85 Harv. L. Rev. at 1380 n. 18. 
100. Compare the panel opinion in Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1974), with the en 
bane decision, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1975) cerl. denied 423 U.S. 824. 
101. See generally United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099 (2nd Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 414 
u.s. 844. 
102. United States v. Marks, 585 F.2d 164, 170 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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eluding that the confrontation argument is "frivolous" 103 or "clearly 
without merit.';104 While some of these opinions do discuss the po-
tential for unusual circumstances which might raise confrontation 
questions, 105 there is a strong adherence to a "per se rule permitting 
the use of properly admissible extra-judicial statements of a co-con-
spirator who did not take the stand at trial without risk of a reversal 
for violation of his co-defendant's right to confrontation."106 
Other courts, however, have been very concerned both with the 
confrontation clause rationale itself as well as the broad reaches of 
the Court's opinion in JJutton. The Second Circuit's recent five year 
odyssey in this area is instructive. In United States v. Puco, 101 the 
panel, in an opinion by Judge Feinberg, concluded that compliance 
with the traditional exception did not constitute per se compliance 
with the confrontation clause. Instead, the court discussed the mean-
ing of .Dutton and explored the questions of whether there were indi-
cia of reliability and whether the co-conspirator's statement was 
"devastating" or "crucial". 108 When the government petitioned for a 
rehearing by the panel, Judge Feinberg clarified the opinion by stat-
ing that the district judge would not have to make a finding of 
whether the declaration was crucial to the government or devastating 
to the defendant before admitting the declaration. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to Judge Feinberg, the government read "too little into JJut-
ton." He concluded that "ignoring the implications of .Dutton ... 
[was] unwarranted and unwise." 109 Judge Lumbard, on the other 
hand, dissented from the opinion in Puco and himself cast doubt on 
the panel's opinion "casting doubt upon the rule regarding the ad-
103. United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1362 (5th Cir. 1978). In fairness to the Fifth 
Circuit, the precise question there was whether Rule 80I(d)(2){E) was unconstitutional because 
it violates the confrontation clause. The more difficult question is not whether the rule itself 
violates the clause, but whether in a given case evidence admitted under it would violate the 
confrontation clause. Nevertheless, Johnson has been seen by other circuits as following the 
automatic rule of compliance with the confrontation clause if the federal rule is satisfied. See, 
e.g., United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1978). 
104. Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 
1128 (1973). 
105. United States v. Hynes, 560 F.2d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 1977). Interestingly enough, the 
court in Hynes cited one of its earlier opinions for the automatic or per se rule, United States v. 
Kelley, 526 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1975). Yet the court in Kelley• actually stated that it construed 
.Dullon "as requiring a case-by-case analysis in determining whether the application of an 
exception to the hearsay rule complies with the confrontation clause." Kelley at 620. 
106. United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977). See also, United States 
v. Montgomery, 582 F.2d 514, 518-19 (lOth Cir. 1978). 
107. 476 F.2d 1099 (2d Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 844. 
108. Id. at 1104. 
109. Id. at 1107. 
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mission of co-conspirator's statements."110 Moreover, he was most 
concerned that the circuit was taking a position on this important 
issue without "positive en bane approval of a majority of the active 
judges of the circuit."111 The entire court denied rehearing en bane 
and little else was heard on this point from the Second Circuit. 112 
Within the past year, however, that court, in an opinion by Judge 
Smith, made clear that Puco was good law and "that .Dutton man-
dates a case-by-case examination to determine whether the defend-
ant's right of confrontation has been abridged."113 
The Ninth Circuit, one of the circuits to reject the automatic 
compliance rule, has been particularly vigilant in its review of the 
confrontation clause challenge. For instance, in United States v. 
Snow, 114 the court explored in some detail the confrontation ques-
tion, looked to four important factors from .Dutton which were indic-
ative of reliability, 115 and carefully weighed the arguments of both 
parties. As that court later succinctly stated: 
The court must determine whether cross-examination of 
the declarant would be likely to show that the declarant's 
statements were unreliable. Another important determina-
tion is whether the evidence is "crucial" or "devastating" to 
the defense. 116 
Like Judge Feinberg, this article would emphasize that the "au-
tomatic compliance" circuits read too little into .Dutton. To be sure, 
they tend to focus only on that portion of .Dutton which indicates 
that "merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-
established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion 
that confrontation rights have been denied." 117 As the Court in .Dut-
ton noted, however, this was only the converse of an equally correct 
proposition. 
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and 
110. /d. at 1109. 
Ill. /d. at 1110. 
112. Only Judges Friendly, Hays, Timbers and Mansfield dissented from the court's order. 
113. United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1978). 
114. 521 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090. 
115. The court set forth four factors indicative of reliability: 
(I) the declaration contained no assertion of a past fact, and consequently carried a 
warning to the jury against giving it undue weight; (2) the declarant had personal 
knowledge of the identity and role of participants in the crime; (3) the possibility that 
the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection was remote; and (4) the circum-
stances under which the statements were made did not provide reason to believe that 
the declarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime. 
/d. at 734. 
116. l)nited States at Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 772 (9th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. 
Wood, 550 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1976). 
117. 400 U.S. at 82, citing, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
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the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect 
similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the 
overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is 
nothirig more or less than a codification of the rules of 
hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at 
common law. Our decisions have never established such a 
congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a viola-
tion of c01!(rontation values even though the statements in is-
sue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay 
exception. (emphasis added) 118 
This statement is absolutely to the point. Simply because the 
hearsay exception has been complied with does not mean that the 
confrontation clause could not be violated. For instance, in a situa-
tion where the co-conspirator exception was satisfied but the declara-
tion was crucial to the prosecution's case, devastating to the defense, 
and there were some indicia of unreliability, it is shocking to think 
that there could not be a serious confrontation clause question. 
While it is highly unlikely that there will be many cases in which the 
hearsay exception will be satisfied but the confrontation clause will 
be violated, 119 this does not speak in support of the automatic com-
pliance rule. There are a good many rules of law governing situa-
tions which arise only rarely. Nevertheless, they are rooted in the 
sound principle that in a given case the violation may be proved and 
118. I d. The Supreme Court continues to make the point very clearly that, while the Con-
frontation Clause principles and the hearsay rules overlap, they are hardly identical. Green v. 
Georgia,- U.S.-, 99 S.Ct. 2150 (1979), for example, involved a twist on the usual siutation. 
A first trial resulted in a jury verdict of guilty. At a second trial, to decide whether capital 
punishment would be imposed, defendant Green sought to introduce the testimony of a wit-
ness who had repeated the incriminating words of the co-defendant at the first trial. This 
testimony would have shown both that the co-defendant had committed the murder and that 
Green had not been present at the time of the killing. Because Georgia does not recognize 
declarations against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule, the testimony was not 
admissible. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of the testimony violated the defend-
ant's due process rights. The testimony was relevant, reliable and quite significant. Indeed, it 
had been used against the co-defendant at his own trial since confessions are admissible 
against the declarant. Quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, (1973), the Court 
noted, "The Hearsay Rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the end of justice" and 
vacated the defendant's sentence. He had been denied a fair trial on the issue of punishment 
because of the exclusion of testimony which was hearsay and which did not come within the 
state's recognized exceptions. (See, dissent of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, -U.S. at-, 99 S Ct. at 
2152.) 
119. But see United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 521 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1979): 
In holding Gonzales' statements inadmissible under Rule 80l(d)(2)(E), we are 
mindful of the fact that a contrary holding would raise serious questions about 
whether appellants were denied their Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by the 
introduction of the Gonzales' statements. This court has recognized that 
"[a]dmissibility under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule does not ... 
automatically demonstrate compliance with the confrontation clause." (Citations 
omitted). 
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may be substantial. Moreover, when the hearsay rule is coupled 
with evidentiary problems such as the so-called "slight evidence" 
rule, 120 further connected to complicity liability for conspirators121 
and the lax standard for admissibility of conspiracy declarations, 122 
it is difficult indeed to justify the automatic compliance rule. 
While specific rules or principles are difficult to set forth in this 
area, the more difficult, yet satisfying, case-by-case analysis to deter-
mine if "the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the 
truth of the prior statement" 123 seems preferable. Perhaps the best 
analysis of the factors to be utilized here was set out by the Tenth 
Circuit in the United States v. Roberts. 124 The court indicated eight 
factors which are relevant in determining whether the confrontation 
clause has been violated. While these factors are hardly exhaustive 
of those which. can be considered, they are most useful in analyzing 
the problem. 
[The Court should consider:] (1) what opportunity 
the jury had to evaluate the credibility of the declarant, (2) 
whether the statements were crucial to the government's 
case or devastating to the defense, (3) the declarant's 
knowledge of the identities and roles of the other co-con-
spirators, (4) whether the extrajudicial statements might be 
founded on faulty recollection, (5) whether the circum-
stances under which the statements were made provide rea-
son to believe the declarant misrepresented defendant's 
involvement in the crime, (6) whether the statements were 
120. "It is well settled that 'where the existence of a conspiracy is shown ... only slight 
additional evidence is required to connect a particular dqendant with it'." United States v. Law-
son, 523 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1975). Citing United States v. McGann, 431 F.2d 1104, 1107 
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 919 (1971) (emphasis in original). Unique among the 
circuits, the Fifth Circuit, formerly one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the slight evi-
dence rule, has finally eliminated the use of the rule entirely. United States v. Malatesta, 590 
F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1979). The slight evidence rule normally is used to prove the connection of 
the defendant as a general matter. It can, however, also be used to establish his connection for 
purposes of showing the admissibility of a co-conspirator's declaration. For a good discussion 
of this point, see, Note, Connecting Dqendants to Conspiracies: The Slight Evidence Rule and 
the Federal Courts, 64 VA. L. REv. 881, 889-892 (1978); United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 
1141 (9th Cir. 1977). 
121. Under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) the co-conspirator is liable for 
all substantive offenses committed pursuant to the conspiracy, even if these offenses were not 
discussed, so long as they were foreseeable. 
122. The standard for admissibility is, obviously, considerably less than the usual reason-
able doubt standard. The normal such standard, as discussed supra, is a preponderance of the 
evidence or proof of a prima facie case. 
123. California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 161. 
124. 583 F.2d 1173 (lOth Cir. 1978). As the court in Roberts noted, "simply pigeonholing 
evidence into a recognized exception is insufficient to show compliance with the confrontation 
clause." Id. at 1176. 
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ambiguous (7) what limiting jury instructions, if any, were 
given, (8) whether prosecutorial misconduct was present, 
etc.I2s 
THE SCOPE OF THE CONSPIRACY, "RICO TO THE RESCUE: THE 
ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY" 126 
One of the most difficult tasks the prosecution faces in a com-
plex conspiracy trial is proving the breadth of a single conspiracy or 
the number of agreements involved in the criminal activities. In re-
cent years many important issues have been raised surrounding this 
problem of defining the scope of the agreement. For instance, there 
is the question of whether a defendant can be charged with two sepa-
rate conspiracy counts for becoming a member of a single conspiracy 
which violated two specific drug conspiracy statutes. 127 Also, there 
was some question as to the ability of Congress to define a single 
group endeavor as both a conspiracy offense and a substantive of-
fense.128 Because these problems bear on the hearsay exception 
problem in only a collateral manner, 129 the discussion here will 
125. /d. at 1176. Interestingly enough, the Tenth Circuit was also the court to decide the 
Montgomery "automatic compliance" case discussed, supra. 
126. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir. 1978). 
127. The early cases on this point prohibited double prosecutions finding that such a result 
was compelled by Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942). See United States v. Ad-
cock, 487 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1974), cerl. 
denied, 421 U.S. 948. The more recent cases allow this double prosecution, focusing on the 
intent of Congress to deal harshly with the drug traffic. See United States v. Houltin, 525 F.2d 
943 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Marotta, 518 F. 2d 681 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Gamer, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978). This rationale was sharply criticized by Judge Rubin in 
United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1251 (5th Cir. 1978). The rule in the Fifth Circuit 
may be subject to change in light of the order by the court to have Rodriguez reheard en bane. 
128. The problem arose because of§ 1955 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 
which was the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 
(1975). The question in Iannelli was not so much the scope or application of§ 1955, as is 
common in the RICO situation, but whether the defendant could be charged with violating 
both§ 1955 (dealing with illegal gambling business) and the general conspiracy section,§ 371. 
In essence, the defendant argued that by definition § 1955 required a conspiracy; hence he 
could not be charged twice for the same offense. The Court rejected this argument and found 
that convictions for both a conspiracy to violate § 1955 and a § 1955 violation were proper. 
129. They do bear on the question, however, and often in a most important way. For 
instance, in the situation involving dual drug conspiracies, if the prosecutor charges the de· 
fendant with violating a specific conspiracy statute, such as conspiracy to import, certain indi· 
viduals who were in that conspiracy (e.g., a middle-man on the importation side) may be co· 
conspirators for purposes of the exception. If, on the other hand, the defendant is only charged 
with conspiracy to distribute, the statement of the importer co-conspirator may not be admissi-
ble against the defendant in that distribution conspiracy. The statement would not be admissi· 
ble because it was not in furtherance of the deftndanl's group. If, instead, the defendant is 
charged with two conspiracy violations-importation and distribution-the statement would 
be admissible for it would have been made in furtherance of one of the conspiracies, the con· 
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center on a scope problem which is the other side of the coin from 
these questions. The question here is not whether a single agreement 
can be divided up for prosecution or punishment purposes. Rather, 
the issue is whether several seemingly separate agreements can be 
charged together as one conspiracy. As a practical matter, this scope 
question can be of great significance to the application of the co-
conspirator declaration role. If numerous conspiracies can be 
charged together as a single all-encompassing agreement, the words 
of one conspirator as to a portion of that activity are admissible 
against all members of all portions of the conspiracy. 130 
Traditionally the issues surrounding the joinder of seemingly 
separate conspiracies as a single one have confounded courts in gen-
eral and the Supreme Court in particular. The courts have spent a 
good deal of time trying to analyze the single conspiracy argument in 
terms of whether the criminal activity fell within the so-called 
wheeP31 or chain conspiracies.132 While the problems surrounding 
the spokes and chains have hardly disappeared and indeed may well 
be plaguing the lower courts more than ever, 133 few new legal devel-
opments in recent years have shed light on an appropriate judicial 
response. Rather, the problem continues as one of definition and 
proof at trial. 
This relatively static nature of things is to be contrasted with a 
very major, and very recent, development found under the guise of 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, commonly 
spiracy to import. This is true, even though the declarant's activities are exactly the same in 
both cases: he is simply the middle-man. 
130. And, of course, the more wide reaching the conspiracy and the more distant the co-
defendants, the less able the defendant is to rebut effectively the co-conspirators' declarations. 
13 I. A wheel conspiracy is present when a single individual (or individuals), the hub, deals 
with various other parties engaging in criminal transactions. The wheel is complete, and thus 
a single large conspiracy can be proved when the groups, the spokes, who deal with the one 
moving force, know that other participants exist and know that their involvement is criminal. 
The major Supreme Court decision in this area is Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 
(1946). 
132. A chain conspiracy is present when there is a criminal operation involving a distribu-
tion system in which parties at one end of the system pass materials to parties at the other end. 
The various parties to the transaction are "links" in the conspiracy, and thus can be joined in a 
single large conspiracy, if they are aware of the general enterprise and their involvement in it. 
The most famous chain conspiracy case is not a Supreme Court decision at all. It is the Second 
Circuit's decision in United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'd on other 
grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). 
133. For excellent judicial discussion of wheels and chains, see the Fifth Circuit's decisions 
in United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51 
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974). See also Note, Federal Treatment of Multiple 
Conspiracies, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 387 {1957). 
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known as RICO. 134 In the decade in which RICO has been alive, 135 
and particularly in the past several years, the courts have had to 
come to grips with a marked change in the analysis of the single 
conspiracy theory. 
The substantive portion of the RICO statute is straightforward. 
Section 1962(c) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associ-
ated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of 
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such en-
terprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity 
or collection of unlawful debt. 
The key words in the provision are defined with clarity in other por-
tions of the statute. An enterprise "includes any individual, partner-
ship, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or 
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal en-
tity."136 Racketeering activity consists of any act or threat involving 
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, narcotics vi-
olations, and most interstate commerce violations. 137 A pattern of 
racketeering activity merely means "two acts of racketeering activ-
ity."138 Given the broad definitions, it truly appears that, in passing 
RICO, Congress attempted to deal a telling and unobstructed blow 
to organized crime. Still, the difficulties in the RICO prosecutions 
have not generally involved violations of the substantive RICO pro-
vision but rather of the section that allows for conviction for having 
conspired to violate the substantive section. 139 This point is made 
especially clear in what is probably the most far reaching interpreta-
tion of RICO, United States v. Elliott. 140 
In E!fiott, two brothers, J.C. and Recea Hawkins, were con-
victed of a substantive violation of RICO, § 1962(c). The substan-
tive violation was easily affirmed because, as the court properly 
found, under the defendant's "loose organization" J.C. was the 
"chairman of the board" and Recea was, at minimum, part of an 
"executive committee" which arranged for the theft and distribution 
of numerous stolen commodities. Even though the criminal en-
134. 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. 
135. Congress enacted the statute in 1970. 
136. § 1961(4). 
137. § 1961(1). 
138. § 1961{5). 
139. § 1962(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of 
the provisions of subsections (a), (b) or (c) of this section." 
140. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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deaver here was a "myriapod criminal network" 141 it was a con-
nected network dealing in everything from arson to car theft to 
murder to narcotics transactions to theft of interstate commercial 
goods. No, the problem with the Elliott case was not that two of the 
major principals were charged on an enterprise theory. Instead, the 
problem was that the government also used a conspiracy charge for 
other participants. 
With regard to the conspiracy argument, the defendant's con-
tention was the usual one made in this area: "[W]hile the indictment 
alleged but one conspiracy, the government's evidence at trial 
proved the existence of several conspiracies." 142 In this particular 
case, the impact of this contention, if proved, was that there was a 
variance between the indictment and the proof which prejudiced 
their trial rights. 143 · The argument obviously would have considera-
ble impact in the hearsay area as well. That is, if the declarant could 
not be properly held as part of a large conspiracy with another mem-
ber, the declarations of the first conspirator could hardly be used 
against the second. 
The defendants named in the conspiracy court were engaged in 
a wide range of activities. Moreover, other than their rather remote 
dealings with a few of the principals in the case, these activities were 
not related. For instance, several of the defendants had no contacts 
whatsoever with Recea Hawkins and were engaged in a particular 
type of criminal activity. In addition, although one of the defend-
ants helped to conceal stolen meat, there was no evidence to indicate 
that he knew that J.C. Hawkins was selling drugs to other persons. 
Similarly, there was no showing that defendants who were furnish-
ing counterfeit titles to a car theft ring knew that a man supplying 
the titles was also stealing goods in interstate commerce. Without 
such knowledge on the part of the defendants a successful single con-
spiracy prosecution for all these defendants was not likely without 
RICO. This much the court conceded. 
Applying pre-RICO conspiracy concepts to the facts of this 
case, we doubt that a single conspiracy could be demon-
strated . . . The enterprise involved in this case probably 
could not have been successfully prosecuted as a single 
conspiracy under the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 
u.s.c. § 371. 144 
141. /d. at 899. 
142. /d. at 900. 
143. Under Kotteakos v. United States, supra. See discussion in PROSECUTION AND DE-
FENSE, supra, at § 4.03. 
144. 571 F.2d at 902. 
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No doubt the court's concessiOn was quite correct. Indeed, 
there have been numerous cases in which suppliers of a small por-
tion of a drug deal were found not to be members of the larger drug 
operation precisely because they were not aware of the larger opera-
tion.145 To be sure, the Elliott court itself cited the Second Circuit's 
holding in United States v. Bertolotti, 146 in which the court 
focused on an alleged narcotics conspiracy that bore little 
resemblence to "the orthodox business operation" found to 
exist in other drug cases; many of the 'narcotics transac-
tions" involved amounted to "little more than simple cash 
thefts" in which no drugs changed hands. The onfy factor 
that tied several isolated transactions together, the Court 
noted, was the presence of two of the defendants . . . in 
each. In effect, "[t]he scope of the operation was defined 
only by [one defendant's] resourcefulness in devising new 
methods to make money". Under these circumstances, the 
Court held that the government had failed to prove the 
existence of a single conspiracy. 147 
Thus, without RICO, and without proof of knowledge of one con-
spirator as to the existence of other conspirators in wholly unrelated 
activities (the drug transactions and the stolen meat transactions 
were hardly bases for knowledge, whether implied or proven in fact), 
the prosecutions would not and should not have been successful 
under the general conspiracy statute. Nevertheless, the court af-
firmed the RICO conspiracy violations. 
The government agreed with the defense that in its prosecution 
it "attempted to achieve a broader application of RICO than has 
heretofore been sanctioned." 148 All too clearly the government was 
right. It is not only a broader application of RICO than in prior 
cases, it is broader than the Constitution and good public policy al-
low. The Fifth Circuit, however, focusing on the Congressional pur-
pose in enacting the Act, did not agree. The chief purpose was 
"to seek the eradication of organized crime . . . by estab-
lishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced 
sanctions and new remedies to deal wtth the unlawful ac-
tivities of those engaged in organized crime." 149 
Because the general conspiracy statute, and existing conspiracy law, 
145. United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975). 
146. 529 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975). 
147. 571 F.2d at 901-902. 
148. 571 F.2d at 884. The court remarked: "RICO has displaced many of the legal 
precepts traditionally applied to concerted criminal activity. Its effect in this case is to free the 
government from the strictures of the multiple conspiracy doctrine and to allow the joint trial 
of many persons accused of diversified crimes." /d. at 900. 
149. /d. at 902, quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). 
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would not allow for the single conspiracy theory of the government, 
the court concluded that RICO intended to authorize exactly that: 
"the single prosecution of a multi-faceted, diversified conspiracy by 
replacing the inadequate 'wheel' and 'chain' rationales with a new 
statutory concept: the enterprise."150 
The magic of the RICO statute, of course, lies in the fact that in 
charging a conspiracy to violate it, the government does not charge a 
conspiracy to violate a particular law or statute but rather a conspir-
acy to "conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through 
a pattern of racketeering activity." 151 According to the court, this 
means that no defendant need agree to commit any particular crimi-
nal activities or even have knowledge of the nature of the other crim-
inal activities. The defendants need only "agree to participate, 
directly and indirectly in the affairs of the enterprise by committing 
two or more predicate crimes." 152 The only real issue is whether the 
court could "reasonably infer that each crime was intended to fur-
ther the enterprise's affairs." 153 Once this overall objective of agree-
ment to further the enterprise was found to exist, the many 
defendants could be joined together, their statements used against 
each of them, and, presumably, substantive offenses committed by 
any one of them charged to the rest. 154 
While the court found that under RICO "remote associates of 
an enterprise may be convicted as conspirators on the basis of purely 
circumstantial evidence," 155 it found no constitutional infirmity with 
that conclusion. The statute only allowed conviction, in the court's 
reasoning, if the defendant engaged in the commission of two or 
more predicate crimes. Hence, the defendant was being convicted 
because of his crimes, not because of the crimes of others. 
The problem with the court's analysis is that in a case like Elli-
ott it is not a fact that the defendant is being convicted of his crimes; 
he is being convicted of the crimes of others. The court itself stated 
that one of the defendants, who was engaged in an arson activity and 
the theft of stolen meats and shirts, "may have been unaware that 
others who agreed to participate in the enterprise's affairs did so by 
selling drugs and murdering a key witness."156 This is said to be 
150. /d. 
151. !d. 
152. !d. 
153. /d. at 902-903. 
154. Under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
155. 571 F.2d at 903. 
156. /d. at 904. 
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irrelevant to the question of whether he participated in the enter-
prise; he did that, according to the court, even though he did not 
agree to commit each of the crimes and was unaware of them. True, 
perhaps, except that the court itself defined the enterprise as a crimi-
nal activity involving, among other things, selling drugs and murder-
ing witnesses. If the defendant had no knowledge of those activities, 
and if the defendant could not reasonably have forseen them, it is 
difficult to justify linking that person with the defendants who com-
mitted murder and who sold drugs, or binding him by their state-
ments. 
While the court perceived in this "no significant extension of a 
co-conspirator's liability," 157 it is hard to see it as anything but a 
tremendous extension, indeed, distortion of the concept of a co-con-
spirator's liability. In the Elliott case itself, four defendants who did 
not commit murder were forced to stand trial with two others who 
did. If they were all properly joined for trial, their statements could 
have been used against each other. This does not go beyond the 
scope of the co-conspirator's liability? No, says the court, even 
though it "ups the ante for RICO violators who personally would 
not contemplate taking a human life." 158 As has been pointed out 
innumerable times, while the co-conspirator need not be aware of all 
facets of the conspiracy, or of all members of it, he must have some 
basic ideas as to what the agreement means. If he does not know the 
nature of the enterprise in the broadest sense, it is difficult to see how 
he could agree criminally to commit the act. 159 The Fifth Circuit 
itself recognized this in a case decided after Elliott. "Nobody is lia-
ble in conspiracy except for the fair import of the concerted purpose 
or agreement as he understands it." 160 
The court's RICO analysis goes well beyond even the Pinkerton 
complicity formulation which itself has been subject to substantial 
criticism. 161 In Pinkerton v. United States, 162 the Supreme Court 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. See generally Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy: The Stale of Mind Crime-Intent, Proving 
Intent, and Anti-Federal Intent, 1976 UN1V. OF ILL. LAW FoRUM 627. 
160. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1269 (5th Cir. 1979) quoting Learned Hand's 
famous opinion in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,403 (2d Cir. 1938). The court went on 
to say, "It is not necessary that the members of the conspiracy know all the details of the plan, 
but they must be aware of the essential nature and scope of the enterprise and intend to partici-
pate." 
161. See Marcus, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code: Conspiracy Provisions, 1978 UN IV. 
OF ILL. LAW FORUM 379, 381-82. 
162. 328 u.s. 640 (1946). 
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held that a conspirator would be liable for all criminal acts of his co-
conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy even if there were no 
knowledge or discussion of those criminal acts, so long as those acts 
were reasonably forseeable. As noted by a Section of the American 
Bar Association, 163 this is broad liability, but at least it requires neg-
ligence, lack of due care. As the court in Elliott interprets RICO, 
however, it appears that the liability of the defendant, going well 
beyond the particular act to which he agreed or that is foreseen, 
amounts to strict liability. That is, the defendant may have no 
knowledge of activities such as murder or drug sales, such activities 
may not be reasonably forseeable, and yet the defendant can be 
joined with the persons who commit those crimes in a single conspir-
acy. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that statements made by 
one conspirator could not be used against all of the conspirators 
under the hearsay exception if this is a proper conspiracy. If this 
does not come very close to being strict liability in the criminal con-
text, it is difficult to see what would. The Elliott court wrote that the 
RICO statute already had a "pervasive scope." Unfortunately, 
under the facts in Elliott, and with the potential for further prosecu-
tions, the court's construction of RICO allows for a far too pervasive 
scope. To echo the words of Judge Ely in stressing concern over 
large, joint conspiracy trials: 
The prejudice to the individual defendant forced to defend 
himself at a joint trial with numerous other alleged co-con-
spirators is compounded in instances where, as here, the 
proof as readily mdicates the existence of a number of iso-
lated transactions or several small conspiracies as it does 
the single conspiracy chars.ed by the prosecution. Just as 
the danger of inferrmg guilt from one codefendant to an-
other increases in proportion to the number of persons 
compelled to stand trial together, the danger of guilt by as-
sociation at a multiple defendant trial mtensifies as the 
number of possible conspiracies grows. Undoubtedly there 
is a tendency for the jury to believe that a defendant must 
have been involved m the alleged all-encompassing con-
spiracy, once it finds that individual to have committed one 
of the minor acts which the prosecution contends is but an 
extension of the greater conspiracy. 164 
CoNCLUSIONS 
Opinions which struggle to define and apply the co-conspira-
163. Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association Policy Regarding S-1, The Pro-
posed Federal Criminal Code (94th Congress) at 5 (adopted August 1975). 
164. United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 523 (9th Cir. 1979) [concurring opinion]. 
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tor's declaration rule continue to abound; although there is substan-
tial basis for the use of the rule, the courts are constantly plagued by 
difficult cases exploring the outer reaches of the principle and pur-
pose behind the rule. With the advent of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, many courts became concerned over legislative involvement 
in this area. Today, however, the Rules stand as a unifying and le-
gitimatizing force in this area. 
While the courts must remain forever vigilant in avoiding ex-
cesses here, most federal judges in recent years have recognized the 
problem and expressed their concern about it through careful scru-
tiny of the rule. The one very troubling judicial action in this area is 
the sweeping interpretation given to the RICO statute. Such a read-
ing can have only the most serious and negative effects in an already 
complex and questionable area of prosecutorial activity. 
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